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This thesis provides an assessment of the existing
supply support system for intermediate and depot air-
launched missile maintenance. Through examination of the
supply support structure, the research effort is directed at
determining the quality of supply support being provided to
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provides conclusions on the performance of the existing
supply support system and provides recommendations for
improvements in the system. In addition, this thesis
develops possible alternatives for supply support of the
Naval Air Systems Command's proposed Omnibus project which
proposes the combining of intermediate and depot levels of
maintenance for air-launched missiles. Applicable measures
of effectiveness which may be used in analyzing the various
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On February 25, 1986 President Reagan signed Executive
Order 12552 entitled the Productivity Program for the
Federal Government . The objectives of this program are to
improve the quality, timeliness and efficiency of services
provided by the Federal Government [Ref. l:p. 7 041]. The
specific goal of the program is to achieve a 20 percent
productivity increase in appropriate functions by 1992. The
President tasked each executive department and agency to
contribute to the achievement of this productivity increase.
The efforts of the Secretary of the Navy to comply with
Executive Order 12552 began with a program called Attack
Cost Through Improvements In Our Navy (ACTION '88) . In this
program the Secretary of the Navy stated that his objectives
were to reduce the cost of acquiring, operating and
maintaining the Navy's equipment and systems [Ref. 2]. The
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and
Logistics, Mr. Everett Pyatt, was placed in charge of this
program. The program was designed to achieve one billion
dollars in cost reductions through productivity improvements
by the end of fiscal year 1988.
One of the projects to achieve ACTION '88 goals is being
developed by Naval Air Systems Command Code 418 (NAVAIR-
418) . This new program will if implemented, combine two
levels of air-launched missile (ALM) 1 maintenance into one
level of maintenance. The existing levels of ALM
maintenance are predominantly performed by Navy (organic)
activities. The program would allow both organic and
commercial activities to vie for the contract to perform the
new level of maintenance.
NAVAIR-418 acts in the capacity of a maintenance and
logistics management coordinator for ALMs since all of the
missile maintenance and support services are performed at
facilities which belong to other commands or the commercial
sector. Transportation and supply support are provided by
the Naval Supply Systems Command.
The maintenance plan for ALMs currently calls for three
levels of maintenance: Organizational (0) level,
Intermediate (I) level and Depot (D) level. Organizational
level maintenance is performed by Navy fleet units;
intermediate maintenance is provided by Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) ; and depot maintenance is performed by
Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) and designated commercial
overhaul points (DOPs) [Ref. 3:p. 10].
1 . Organizational Level Maintenance
Organizational maintenance is the lowest level of
repair that can be performed on an ALM and is the
responsibility of fleet aircraft squadrons stationed aboard
1ALMs are missiles which are usually fired from Navy
aircraft and include the Sidewinder, Phoenix, Harpoon,
Shrike, Walleye, Sparrow and Harm missiles.
an aircraft carrier (CV, CVN) or at Naval Air Stations
(NAS) . Organizational maintenance is constrained to
extremely simple tasks which include:
(1) removing the missile from the storage container
(2) attaching flight control surfaces (wings)
(3) uploading and downloading of missiles from
aircraft.
Diagnostic testing of missiles and replacement of faulty-
internal missile components and missile sections are not
performed at this level of maintenance. Testing at the
organizational level is limited to determining if the
missile is functioning properly or not (go/no go testing)
.
An example of testing performed at this level would be
checks to insure electrical continuity of the missile system
[Ref. 3:p. 15]. Figure 1-1 provides a representation of a
generic ALM with its various missile sections.
2 . Intermediate Level Maintenance
The intermediate level is the next echelon of
maintenance. ALMs reguire induction into an Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA) if they meet one of the following
four criteria [Ref. 4:pp. 9-10]:
(1) Expiration of Serviceable-In-Service-Time (SIST)
.
SIST is the length of time a missile can be made
available for use without an IMA inspection. After
every IMA inspection a new maintenance due date (MDD)
is assigned to the missile based on the SIST and
service life 2 .

























(2) Missile failure. Reasons for failure can include
damage in shipping and handling as well as corrosion
caused by exposure to salt water while uploaded on an
aircraft.
(3) Missile has been used for a captive flight on an
aircraft. When a missile has been taken from a
storage container, loaded on an aircraft and flown on
an aircraft mission but not fired, the missile must
be returned to the IMA at the end of the carrier
deployment for inspection and cleaning.
(4) Missile requires conversion. Conversion is a process
which upgrades a missile and is accomplished by
replacing or modifying missile components.
The intermediate maintenance for ALMs is performed
at Naval Weapons Stations (NWS) with one exception: Missile
Maintenance Unit One (MMU-1) located in Subic Bay, Republic
of the Phillipines. The NWSs become the focal points of the
missile logistics network. All new production missiles,
reworked missiles, and missiles turned in by the fleet must
successfully pass testing at the intermediate level before
being certified as ready-for-issue (RFI) . Missiles must be
certified as RFI before they are loaded out on fleet units.
The concept for testing at IMAs calls for missile
sections to be assembled and tested as a complete missile,
which is called an All-Up-Round (AUR) , instead of being
tested in individual sections. Components or sections which
do not pass testing can be replaced at the IMA. These
failed components become the candidates for depot level
repair. In addition, there are certain types of
modification kits which can be installed by the IMA.
In addition to MMU-1 there are three activities
which presently provide intermediate maintenance for ALMs.
They are the Concord Naval Weapons Station located in
Concord, CA; Yorktown Naval Weapons Station located in
Yorktown, VA; and Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station,
Fallbrook Annex, Fallbrook, CA. Naval Sea Systems Command
is ultimately responsible for operating these facilities.
3 . Depot Level Maintenance
Depot level maintenance performed at designated
overhaul points (DOPs) is the highest level of maintenance
authorized on ALMs. The IMAs forward failed components and
missile sections to the designated overhaul points (DOPs)
for repair.
AURs are not currently sent to the depots by the
U.S. Navy for repair. However, in the case of the Harpoon
missile many foreign governments possessing the Harpoon
missile system send AURs to United States depots for repair
and return because they lack intermediate level maintenance
facilities.
Depot level maintenance is performed at both organic
(Navy) and commercial activities. The primary organic
depots are the NADEPs. The two NADEPs engaged in ALM repair
are NADEP Norfolk located in Norfolk, VA and NADEP Alameda
located in Alameda, CA. There are 12 commercial activities
engaged in depot repair. Most of these commercial
activities use their missile production facilities to repair
missiles.
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) has
built an independent depot maintenance facility for repair
of the Harpoon missile. Depot level maintenance of ALMs
usually transitions from the prime contractor to a NADEP as
prescribed by the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)
.
In this unique case MDAC was selected to be the depot
maintenance facility for the life of the Harpoon missile.
Maintenance at the depot level is both extensive and
complex. Extremely sensitive diagnostic testing is
performed which will allow for repairs at the lowest
possible subcomponent level. Modification kits may also be
installed at the depot level.
4 . Contracting for the New ALM Maintenance Concept
The organizational level of maintenance will not be
affected by the new maintenance concept. Organizational
level maintenance will continue to be performed by military
personnel
.
The Federal Government has recently placed great
emphasis on the contracting out of services to the
commercial sector, as well as encouraging the growth of full
and open competition [Ref. 5]. Contracting for the new ALM
maintenance concept will be in keeping with this guidance by
allowing both organic and commercial activities to bid on
the contract.
The new combined intermediate and depot maintenance
concept is called the Omnibus. The Omnibus will be required
to perform all of the functions currently being performed by
the two levels of maintenance it is replacing. An Omnibus
contractor will not be required to perform the direct
receipt function and the storage and issue of missiles at
the waterfront. 3 This function will remain at the Naval
Weapons Stations.
Under the Omnibus concept, AURs which are not RFI
will be returned by the fleet units to an NWS for
transhipment to the organic or contractor's maintenance
facility. The reasons for declaring an AUR not-ready-for-
issue (NRFI) would be the same as previously described for
induction into an existing IMA.
The maintenance to be performed at the combined
maintenance facility will include: test of the AUR,
disassembly of the missile sections (if required), test of
the failed section, repair of the section and reassembly.
At this point it should be made clear that this new
maintenance concept is still under development. A briefing
on the plan was given to representatives of commercial and
3 In addition to performing intermediate maintenance on
ALMs NWSs also provide storage of the ALMs in magazines.
When the ALMs are required for a carrier deployment the
missiles are loaded onto an ammunition ship (AE) for further
delivery to the carrier. Upon termination of a deployment
the carrier will offload ALMs to an AE for further transport
back to an NWS. NWSs also receive new production assets
from contractors.
organic activities on 27 July 1987. Activities interested
in the concept were asked to provide responses to a Request
for Information no later than 1 December 1987. NAVAIR-418
intends to gather enough data from these responses to write
a Request for Proposals (RFP)
.
Some of the aspects of the concept which are to be
addressed in the responses include the following:
(1) feasibility of developing a generic/common set of
test equipment to repair each type of ALM included
in the Omnibus
(2) provisions for a transportation pipeline to and from
the NWS and the Omnibus facility or facilities
(3) provisions for the contractor to provide full supply
support for the Omnibus maintenance facility
(4) provisions for obtaining maintenance engineering for
the ALMs in the Omnibus.
The Omnibus concept will apply to the ALMs and
equipment listed in Appendix A.
In addition to the direction provided by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and
Logistics to pursue this new maintenance concept, NAVAIR-418
also has additional incentives to explore the Omnibus
concept. One of the key incentives is the tremendous future
growth of the ALM inventory. By the year 2000 this
inventory will have tripled in size. Because of a projected
austere fiscal outlook it is forecasted that the budgets for
maintenance will not receive the same percentage of growth
as the budgets for ALM inventories [Ref . 6]
.
Also of major concern is that military construction
funds are not expected to be made available to build
additional facilities which will be required to meet the
maintenance needs of the growing ALM inventory.
NAVAIR-418 hopes that increased productivity and
economies arising from the Omnibus concept will allow for
performance of all required maintenance actions within the
anticipated budget constraints.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First an
assessment is made of the existing supply support system for
intermediate and depot ALM maintenance. Aspects of the
supply support structure will be examined to make a
determination about the quality of supply support being
provided to the maintenance facilities.
The second purpose of this thesis is to identify and
analyze the alternatives for supply support of the Omnibus.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the first purpose of this thesis the following
research questions were formulated:
1. Is the existing supply support for intermediate and
depot ALM maintenance facilities adequate? If not,
determine the root causes of this inadequacy.
2. Determine if the existing supply support structure can
be improved.
Given the second purpose the following research
questions apply:
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1. Determine the various alternatives to provide supply
support for the Omnibus program.
2. Identify the applicable measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) to be used in evaluating these alternatives.
D. SCOPE
This study will provide an analysis of the existing
supply support posture for intermediate and depot level
maintenance of ALMs. It will further provide an analysis of
the supply support needs of the Omnibus program. A major
thrust of the thesis will be to provide a comparison of the
supply support which can be provided by the Navy and that
which can be provided by the commercial sector.
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) has been
in the forefront of industry's efforts to obtain government
contracts for depot level maintenance of ALMs. Because of
these efforts and their willingness to provide data on
supply support from their existing depot ALM maintenance
facility, MDAC will be used as a representative commercial
depot facility for comparisons in this study.
This study will focus on the 1H and 7E cognizance group
items as they comprise the biggest portion of the ALM
material supply support provided to NWSs and NADEPs by SPCC.
E. LIMITATIONS
Supply support of ALMs is an extremely unique subject.
ALM weapons systems fall under the cognizance of NAVAIR
which is predominantly concerned with the development,
11
procurement and management of aircraft weapons systems. The
Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in Philadelphia, PA is
the inventory control point (ICP) which is dedicated to
providing supply support to these aircraft weapons systems.
It would seem logical that since the ALMs are launched from
aircraft platforms and because they are managed by NAVAIR
that the ICP for ALM repair parts would be ASO. This is not
the case. Since ALMs are classified as weapons instead of
aircraft, the Navy's ICP for ALMs is the Ships Parts Control
Center (SPCC) in Mechanicsburg, PA. ALM supply support is
only a very small portion of the volume of business
transacted by SPCC whose major responsibility is to provide
supply support for submarines, surface ships and their
support equipment. In addition, the Naval Weapons Stations
(NWSs) providing the intermediate maintenance support for
ALMs are under the control of Commander Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) and the Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs)
providing the depot level ALM maintenance are under the
control of NAVAIR. Both the NWSs and NADEPs are managed as
Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) activities.
The command relationships described above have led to
interesting developments in supply support. For example,
because the NWSs and NADEPs are NIF activities, they cannot
receive a Consolidated Shorebase Allowance List (COSBAL) to
support their maintenance requirements since COSBALs are
funded by the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) . There also have been
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several unique supply support programs created by the
existing supply structure. Examples of these programs
include the Industrial Demand Forecasting (IDF) program run
by SPCC and NAVAIR and the Harpoon Depot Support Material
List (DSML) at MDAC. Comparative analysis of these programs
was not possible because the structures of the programs are
very different, there are different constraints applied to
each program, and most of the data being collected under
each program is incompatible.
F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters, an
introduction, three research chapters, and a final chapter
which includes a summary, conclusions and recommendations.
Chapter II provides an analysis of the existing supply
support system for intermediate and depot level maintenance
of ALMs. Chapter III identifies supply support alternatives
for the Omnibus concept and provides an analysis of each
alternative. Chapter IV identifies measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) which can be used to evaluate the
alternatives which were identified in Chapter III. Chapter
V provides a summary of the analysis and makes conclusions
and recommendations.
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II. THE EXISTING SUPPLY SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR INTERMEDIATE
AND DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE OF AIR-LAUNCHED
MISSILES
One of the key elements which contributes to the
operational capability and availability of ALMs is logistic
support. A well defined integrated logistics support plan
(ILSP) will keep critical systems in the desired state of
readiness
.
Integrated logistics support planning calls for the
designing of support concurrent with system design so that
an optimal blend of support elements can be obtained. These








(6) Training and training support
(7) Computer resources support
(8) Facilities
(9) Packaging, handling, storage and transportation
(10) Design interface.
Using logistic support analysis (LSA) , ILS elements and
system designs are subjected to numerous tradeoffs. The
14
emergent products are those which meet system readiness
objectives at the minimum cost.
The ILS element pertaining to ALMs which is of concern
to this study is supply support. Supply support is a rather
broad area as the following definition shows:
Supply support includes all spares (units, assemblies,
modules, etc.), repair parts, consumables, special
supplies and related inventories needed to support prime
mission oriented equipment, software, test and support
equipment, transportation and handling equipment, training
equipment and facilities. Supply support also covers
provisioning documentation, procurement functions,
warehousing, distribution of material and the personnel
associated with the acquisition and maintenance of
spare/repair part inventories at all support locations.
[Ref. 8:p. 10]
A. NAVY SUPPLY SUPPORT PROVIDED TO NAVY REPAIR ACTIVITIES
NAVAIR-418 is the inventory control point (ICP) for
ALMs, missile sections, wings, fins, All-Up-Round (AUR)
containers and certain support equipment. This material has
cognizance symbol 8E. SPCC is the ICP for repairable and
consumable repair parts and missile section containers.
This material has cognizance symbols of 1H and 7E. Table
II-l is a complete listing of cognizance symbols applicable
to ALMs which are managed by Navy ICPs [Ref. 9:pp. 7-1].
As previously noted in Chapter I-D, this thesis will
focus on the 1H and 7E cognizance group items because they
constitute the greatest portion of the ALM material supply
support being provided by SPCC to the NWSs and NADEPs.
When a new ALM system is acquired by the Navy, the




Item Description Cognizance Symbol
Missile repair parts (consumable) 1H
Missile explosives and repair parts 2E/4E
Support equipment (major test sets) 2V
Support equipment (minor test
equipment) 6M
Missile repair parts (repairable) 7E
Missile components, sections and
containers 8E
phases. Phase I is called Contractor or Augmented Support
and Phase II is called Operational Support.
Contractor Support may call for the contractor to
provide supply support to all three levels of ALM
maintenance. This support plan usually calls for the
contractor to stock repair parts (both consumables and
repairables) at the maintenance sites. These stocks of
material are called Support Material Lists (SMLs) . These
SMLs are funded by NAVAIR.
Operational supply support begins when Navy activities
become capable of providing the supply support for the
missile. This is referred to as the Material Support Date
(MSD) . The MSD should be scheduled 90 to 180 days prior to
the Navy Support Date (NSD) targeted for the ALM. The Navy
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Support Date is the date when the Navy can effectively
employ the ALM in a fleet unit [Ref. 10:encl.3:p. 2].
Prior to the MSD the missile system must go through a
provisioning process. As the Program Support Inventory
Control Point (PSICP) for ALM repair parts, SPCC must receive
certain data which is essential to the provisioning process.
Two of the key data elements are the Program Support Data
(PSD) and Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD)
.
1. Program Support Data
PSDs are necessary for the requirements
determination of initial, interim and follow-on secondary
item spares and repair parts [Ref. 10:p. 1] . PSD inputs are
provided by NAVAIR-418 to SPCC (Code 0533). PSDs must
describe each item of hardware acquisition for an ALM weapon
system in complete detail and should be submitted to SPCC a
budget leadtime (approximately 3 years) in advance of the
anticipated requirement. PSDs are to be submitted for all
new end item procurements, field changes and modifications
to equipment, additional equipment procurements, procurement
terminations, and for planning revisions of the weapon
system. Planning revisions noted above refer to any
significant changes made in an end item's procurement cost,
quantities or schedule. The submission of timely and
accurate PSDs to the PSICP is essential for the supply
support of ALMs as the following excerpt from Naval Material
Command Instruction 4420. 2A explains:
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The importance of providing accurate PSD on all current
and planned equipment acquisitions cannot be
overemphasized; it is fundamental to assuring that
resources will be available for spares and repair parts
procurement. [Ref.10: encl. l:p. 1]
The PSD has two purposes. The first is to allow
NAVAIR to develop the secondary item budget for interim
support 4 repair parts. The second is to allow SPCC to
develop a secondary item5 budget for the retail and supply




The Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) is
the technical information about an equipment from which SPCC
can determine the repair parts that will be required to
support it. The PTD which is usually procured from the
prime contractor includes the Provisioning Parts List (PPL)
.
3 Provisioning Conference
When SPCC has all of the preliminary provisioning
data assembled a provisioning conference is held to
determine which items will be initially stocked in the
supply system. 6
4 Interim repair parts support may be required to support a
weapons system prior to that system reaching its Navy support
date. Interim support is usually provided by the prime
contractor.
5Secondary items are end items which are consumable or
repairable and do not constitute a principle item. Principle
items such as ships and aircraft are a final combination of end
items.
6This decision is only made for items not already stocked
in the supply system. Those items which are already stocked
don't have any additional stock added to the inventory in
18
Representatives from SPCC, NAVAIR, prime
contractors, sub-contractors, Pacific Missile Test Center,
Point Mugu, CA and Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA may
be in attendance at a provisioning conference for an ALM
weapon system.
Utilizing the PPL, representatives at the conference
will make the following assignments [Ref. ll:pp. 2-30]:
(1) Source, Maintenance, Recoverability (SM&R) codes
(2) Technical Replacement Factors (TRFs)
(3) Initial Best Replacement Factors (BRFs)
(4) Allowance Overrides
(5) Military Essentiality Codes (MECs)
Those new items selected for provisioning and management by
SPCC will be cataloged by the Defense Logistic Service
Center (DLSC) and assigned a National Stock Number (NSN)
.
4 . Provisioning Supply Support Computations
Retail and wholesale stock requirements are computed
by SPCC for new items. Utilizing the Navy Stock Fund (NSF)
SPCC will "buy-in" to the supply system inventory
requirements. This material will subsequently be sold to
the end user. Funds received from the sale will be used to
reimburse the NSF.
For existing items of supply managed by SPCC,
Planned Program Requirements (PPRs) will be loaded into the




computerized files which will ultimately create additional
stock buys through the Supply Demand Review (SDR) program
[Ref. ll:pp. 2-30].
Provisioned items requiring supply support which are
not managed by SPCC will be obtained by using a Supply
Support Request (SSR) . The SSR will be sent to the
appropriate ICP which manages the item and will include the
predicted annual demand and retail outfitting requirements.
5. COSAL/COSBAL Support
A Coordinated Shipboard/Shorebase Allowance List
(COSAL/COSBAL) provides the organizational level of
maintenance with a complete listing of equipment and spare
parts authorized for stockage at their activity. Supporting
Supply Departments will ensure that this material is on
hand, on order, or being pushed to the activity. 7
The intermediate maintenance facilities are less
fortunate in their supply support posture. The Integrated
Logistics Support Plans (ILSPs) for ALMs indicated that a
COSBAL would be utilized to support the IMAs. The ILSPs
indicate that to obtain COSBAL support, NAVAIR-418 should
submit a request to SPCC (Code 0533) via NAVSUP. However,
because all the Naval Weapons Station IMAs are funded by the
7 C0SALs which are prepared by SPCC are designed to
support the organizational level of maintenance on the
aircraft carrier. COSBALs which are also prepared by SPCC
are designed to support the aviation squadron's
organizational maintenance needs when it returns to a Naval
Air Station between carrier deployments.
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Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) , they are excluded by Naval
Supply Systems Command from obtaining COSBAL support [Ref.
12 :p. 1] . This is in contrast to the aviation community
where the IMAs are not NIF activities and are fully
supported by a Shore Consolidated Allowance List (SHORCAL)
provided by ASO. COSBALs cannot be prepared for organic
depot maintenance facilities as they are also NIF funded
activities.
The lack of a COSBAL to support the NWS IMAs has
affected the quality of supply support being provided to the
IMAs, especially in the area of support equipment [Ref. 13].
A COSBAL is designed to support a naval shore based
activity's maintenance efforts in the same manner as a COSAL
supports a ship. Exceptions that are made in COSBAL
processing from that of a COSAL include manipulation of the
protection period and insurance range criteria. A COSBAL
will provide a consolidated listing of spares, repair parts
and consumable items which have been tailored to the
specific activity's requirements. The COSBAL further
contains the authorized allowance quantities of non-demand
based items required to support the activity. Included
among these requirements are many insurance items which are
vital to effective supply support of the IMA's support
equipment. Creation of a COSBAL for NWS IMAs would allow
for protected stockage of vital insurance items at each IMA.
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NIF activities are not precluded from stocking
required materials in their NIF stores account. However, to
stock these items requires the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) to
buy the material from the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) . The price
tag for the consumable requirements is not prohibitive, and
even though the items may not meet demand criteria required
for a NIF stores account, they can be stocked as insurance
items [Ref. 14:pp. 1-43]. Repairable assets can also be
stocked in NIF inventories. However, the cost of initially
stocking these items is extremely high because the assets
must be bought from the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) at the
standard price. 8 NIF activities cannot afford to have high
levels of investment in material inventories. For example,
to keep the level of material investment to a minimum, NADEP
Alameda stocks no repairable items in their stores accounts.
Other activities, such as NWS Concord, maintain minimal
quantities of repairable items. Because of this, the
insurance assets which are essential to maintaining high
levels of productivity at the IMAs and depots are not
available in the NIF activities stores accounts and may not
be readily available from wholesale system stock.
8Standard price is the full price of a repairable
asset. Net price is the price an activity would pay if they
had a not-ready-for-issue (NRFI) repairable carcass to turn
into the supply system.
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6 . Naval Weapons Station and Naval Aviation Depot
Supply Support
At this juncture it is important to note that NWSs
are also stock points for designated wholesale system stock
for ALM material. They report inventory transactions to
SPCC using the Transaction Item Reporting (TIR) system. In
contrast, NADEPs performing depot ALM maintenance are not
wholesale stockpoints. If a NADEP does not have an item in
NIF stores, its point of entry for the requirement into the
supply system is the supporting supply center, which for
NADEP Alameda is NSC Oakland and for NADEP Norfolk is NSC
Norfolk. If an IMA at an NWS has a repair part requirement
which isn't available from NIF stores at a NWS, it is then
screened for availability from the NWS ' s wholesale stock.
If not available from on hand assets it is referred to SPCC.
If a NSC cannot fill a NADEP 1 s requirement, it will also be
referred to SPCC for further supply action.
It would seem that since the NWSs have both NIF
stores material and wholesale stock on hand, they should be
able to provide the IMAs with the requisite levels of supply
support. The NWSs do have the means to provide adequate
supply support for those items which generate sufficient
demand. However, for those critical insurance items which
are repairables with low demand (primarily required for
support equipment) there appears to be a complete breakdown
in the supply support mechanism. The requirements cannot be
identified and supported by a COSBAL nor are they adequately
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supported in the NIF inventories because of the high cost of
the investment.
An example of this dilemma is highlighted in a
message from NAVAIR to SPCC in July 1987 which addressed the
lack of supply support for the Harpoon Missile Subsystem
Test Set (MSTS) [Ref. 15]. The MSTS is an automatic test
set for Harpoon missile section testing. There are four of
these test sets located at two sites, NWS Concord and NWS
Yorktown. The following specific points were addressed:
(1) Based on 1985 data accumulated by NWS Concord only
40 percent of demands for MSTS material were
satisfied by on hand material at NWS Concord.
(2) 20 percent of those requirements not satisfied by NWS
Concord were satisfied by either cannibalization
action of another test set or from a service contract
with Hewlett Packard.
(3) The remaining 40 percent which were not satisfied
locally were referred to SPCC.
(4) MSTS maintainability specifications call for a Mean-
Time-To-Repair (MTTR) of 4 hours in order to achieve
an operational availability (A ) of 85 percent.
(5) Requested that if SPCC was unable to improve MSTS
supply support to acceptable levels, then all MSTS
peculiar spares and residual MSTS initial investment
items (SML assets) be turned over to NAVAIR-418
management at no cost effective 1 January 1988.
Discussions with Mr. Dave Bainbridge, SPCC code
05332, indicate that few improvements can be made in MSTS
support and ALM support in general unless the restriction on
providing COSBALs to Naval Weapons Stations is rescinded by
NAVSUP [Ref. 13]. The wholesale provisioning models often
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do not generate adequate support for the critical insurance
items especially in the area of major support equipment. 9
If the restriction on providing COSBAL support was
lifted, the COSBAL would have to be computed using the
Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program (MOD-
FLSIP) which uses an exclusion factor of .1 demand per year.
Current instructions for preparing a COSBAL to support a
shorebased activity in the Continental United States
(CONUS) that does not have a mission which requires
deployment call for computations based on the Fleet
Logistics Support Improvement Program (FLSIP) utilizing an
exclusion factor of 1.0 demand per year [Ref. 12:p. 4]. The
problem with the FLSIP program is that it fails to identify
and recognize many critical repair parts essential to an
activity's mission. It also fails to support critical items
with historical demand just below the insurance threshold
criteria for insurance stockage (Ref. ll:pp. 2-50). The
MOD-FLSIP computed COSBAL is designed to provide support for
those insurance items which are excluded by the FLSIP model.
An option for providing better support to the NWSs
which could also be used at the organic depots would be for
SPCC to prepare a COSBAL for informational use for these
activities. The NIF activities could use these COSBALs to
9An example of this is provided by SPCC's System
Material Availability (SMA) of 62.3 percent for the Harpoon
MSTS for the months of June, July, August 1987. This is
well below SPCC's goal of 85 percent.
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identify those insurance items they need to stock. The NIF
activities would have to submit a funded requisition to SPCC
to procure these items. Indications are that NIF activities
would be willing to maintain these items in their NIF stores
if NAVAIR provided the funds to buy the material from the
NSF. The material purchased would then be capitalized into
the NIF stores account.
To provide emphasis to the argument that measures
must be taken to improve ALM supply support, Table II-2
presents statistics that were obtained from SPCC (Code 0533)
which reflect the System Material Availability (SMA) for key
ALMs. SMA is the measurement system used by SPCC to gage
its success in providing wholesale supply support. The goal
of SPCC is to achieve an SMA of eighty-five percent or
better. It can be clearly seen that in several areas SPCC
falls very short of meeting this goal. This directly impacts
on ALM maintenance supply support.
TABLE II-2
SPCC SYSTEM MATERIAL AVAILABILITY (PERCENT) FOR JUNE, JULY,
AUGUST 1987
Sparrow Phoenix Sidewinder Shrike
65 79.8 61.5 74.9
Walleye Harm Harpoon Harpoon MSTS
85.7 38.8 58.3 62.3
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7. Additional Problems Which Affect SPCC's Ability
To Provide Supply Support for Air-Launched Missiles
In addition to being prohibited from providing
COSBAL support to NWSs and NADEPs, SPCC has two other
problems which are affecting its ability to provide supply
support for ALMs . The most critical of the problems is that
SPCC (Code 0533) is not receiving PSD inputs from NAVAIR-418
in a timely manner and in some cases not receiving the PSD
inputs at all. As discussed earlier, PSD inputs are vitally
important in ensuring that resources are made available for
procuring repair parts and identifying the requirements for
repair parts. The problem stems from a lack of
communication between NAVAIR-418 and SPCC (Code 0533) which
apparently has existed for some time. One senior NAVAIR-418
official indicated that the only way to solve the
communications problem would be to create an ICP which was
solely dedicated to missile management and which could be
called the Missile Supply Office [Ref . 16]
.
During fiscal year 1987 SPCC received only two PSD.
These were for the Hellfire and Penguin missiles which will
be included in the submission of the 1990 Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) . SPCC has not received any PSD inputs
which document the projected 3 00 percent increase in the ALM
inventory [Ref. 13]. The 300 percent increase in the ALM
inventory is graphically depicted in Figure II-l. In a 25
September 1987 letter to NAVAIR-418, SPCC (Code 0533)
reiterated that SPCC could take no action to request POM
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Figure II-l Growth of Total Missile Inventory
to Year 2000 [Ref. 6]
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1990 funds for supply support of any missile system,
training device, or test set (new or existing system) other
than those for which they have received PSD inputs [Ref.
17]. An article in Aviation Week and Space Technology sheds
light on the magnitude of the problem. Citing a draft GAO
report, it reported that the Navy plans to procure the
following ALMs [Ref. 18:pp. 34-35]:
(1) 7,204 AIM-54C Phoenix missiles with an average unit
cost of $992,000
(2) 7,944 AIM-7M Sparrow missiles with an average unit
cost of $183,000
(3) 3,971 AGM/RGM/UGM-84A Harpoon missiles with an
average unit cost of $854,000.
If the new PSD for these missiles and their support
equipment is not provided then SPCC will continue to program
and budget the support based on the last PSD. This would
not be adequate to meet the requirements of the expanded
inventory.
It is of utmost importance that the appropriate
people at SPCC and NAVAIR resolve the existing
communications problem and develop a link which will allow
vital information (such as the PSD) to flow in order to
secure the best possible supply support within the existing
supply system.
Long procurement lead times are also detracting from
ALM supply support being provided by SPCC. The average
administrative lead time for the procurement of ALM spare
and repair parts at SPCC is 10.2 months. This is the time
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that it takes SPCC to award the contract. This
administrative lead time is consistent with that of other
weapon systems at SPCC. The cause of the long lead times is
the stringent procurement regulations which are prescribed
for the Department of Defense.
8 . Initiatives To Improve Air-Launched Missile Supply
Support
One program that has been undertaken to improve ALM
supply support is called the Industrial Demand Forecasting
(IDF) program. The program was started after reviews
indicated that forecasting of maintenance demands in the
SPCC reguirements and budget system could result in
considerable improvement in repair parts supply support and
alleviate recurring material support problems. An agreement
between NAVAIR, NAVSUP, and NAVSEA implemented the program
in February, 1986 [Ref. 19].
The basic concept of the IDF program is to provide
SPCC with a forecast of what the maintenance activities
believe their demand will be for essential repair parts.
SPCC's forecasts which are based on historical demand, may
be understated. This would negatively affect ALM supply
support. Some of the reasons SPCC's data base may be
incorrect are as follows [Ref. 19:p. 3]:
(1) Engineering/design changes to end item components
result in a variation of demand patterns.
(2) Dynamic end item maintenance programs trying to
achieve optimization of availability cause a
variation in repair parts demand patterns.
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(3) Repair parts are, in many cases repaired concurrent
with the end item. Usage data on these types of
repairs is not reported into the demand data base.
(4) Allocation of components for U. S. Navy use is
affected by interservice, foreign military sales or
commercial depot agreements.
NAVAIR, NWSs and NADEPs (performing missile repair)
can submit candidates for IDF review by SPCC in February and
July of each year. SPCC will perform computations to
determine if the IDF maintenance forecast 10 is significantly
different from the SPCC forecast. If the demand difference
exceeds a specified threshold the NADEP/NWS will be held
responsible for funding the procurement of the additional
guantities. Such a guantity is referred to as the risk
guantity. SPCC goes through a series of steps to determine
which activity will assume the responsibility for the risk
guantity. These steps are described below [Ref. 19:p. 4]:
(1) Each item is designated as either a slow or fast
mover. A slow mover is any item which has 3 or less
reguisitions per quarter and an actual demand
guantity of 25 or less per guarter. A fast mover
is an item experiencing more than 3 reguisitions per
guarter or a total demand guantity greater than 25.
(2) Determine the difference (demand DELTA) between
forecasted maintenance requirements and historical
demand for each IDF item. The demand DELTA is the
total forecasted maintenance requirements for the
next eight quarter period, minus the past four
10The IDF maintenance forecast is derived using data
from the Air-Launched Missile Maintenance Activity Five-Year
Plan for scheduled inductions of missiles and from the
Maintenance Data Collection System historical usage rates
for end items and components. The maintenance forecasts may
differ considerably from SPCC's usage rates because of
changes in the induction schedule and design changes in the
missile components.
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quarters' recorded demand average at SPCC
multiplied by two.
(3) Determine the risk quantity based on the current SPCC
average quarterly demand for slow movers and two
times the SPCC current average quarterly demand for
fast movers. The risk decision value is based on a
demand DELTA of $2,500. If the demand DELTA is
qreater than the risk value of $2,500 and greater
than the risk quantity the NADEP/NWS has the
responsibility to submit a funded Extended Required
Delivery Date (ERDD) requisition to SPCC.
When the ERDD requisition is submitted and loaded
into SPCC files it will generate a Planned Program
Requirement (PPR) (for 1H and 7E cogs) which will in turn
generate a procurement. The ERDD requisition will become an
active requisition 60 days prior to the computed required
delivery date and will be processed for material delivery to
the requisitioner.
If the demand DELTA value is less than or equal to
$2,500 or the demand DELTA quantity is less than or equal to
the risk quantity, SPCC will assume the risk, and will load
funded PPRs which will in turn generate a procurement.
The IDF candidates which are 9 cog items will be
submitted by SPCC to the Defense Logistics Agency unit which
handles Special Program Requirement Transactions.
The consensus among the NIF activities is that IDF
is an excellent program for solving long term supply
problems. However, the program cannot provide quick
solutions to the urgently required material needs.
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9 . Expediting Problems
During the semi-annual ALM Maintenance Workload
Conference held in August 1987 a presentation was given on
supply support by a representative of NAVAIR-418. During
the presentation the problem of how activities should
expedite urgently required repair parts was brought up by
several representatives in attendance. There was a great
deal of confusion over the following issues:
(1) What priority did requisitions have to have assigned
before they could be expedited?
(2) What method of expediting would be accepted/desired
by SPCC, i.e., Naval message or phone calls to item
managers?
(3) When would NAVAIR get involved in the expediting
process, i.e., what steps must the requisitioner take
before requesting expediting action from NAVAIR?
(4) Who at NAVAIR-418 would take the expediting request
for action?
It is clear that an agreement similar to that
generated for the IDF program is needed to address a
standardized program for delineating methods and
responsibilities in expediting of urgently required ALM
repair parts. Such an agreement would eliminate the
existing confusion and promote greater efficiency among
those tasked with expediting duties.
B. NAVY SUPPLY SUPPORT PROVIDED TO CONTRACTOR REPAIR
ACTIVITIES
Contractor activities are currently only engaged in
providing depot level maintenance for ALM sections and
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components. The contract may call for the contractor to
provide all repair parts. This is called Contractor
Furnished Material (CFM) . Another option would be for the
government to provide some of the spare parts as Government
Furnished Material (GFM) , with the remainder provided by the
contractor as CFM. An additional option would be for the
government to provide all the material as GFM. A derivative
of this option is to fund a contractor to purchase the
needed repair parts and stock them as GFM. This latter
option is currently being used by NAVAIR-418 to support
depot maintenance of the Harpoon missile at MDAC.
With the exception of the GFM for the Harpoon missile
mentioned above, SPCC (Code 0533) is responsible for
providing the GFM repair parts (1H, 7E cog) required by the
contractors. Initial stocks of material will be stored at
the contractor's plant and will be maintained in bonded
storerooms. SPCC is notified of issues made from the bonded
storeroom and replenishment requisitions are sent by the
contractor to the item managers at SPCC. The current system
is labor intensive since the contractors must submit
requirements by manual 1348 requisition documents to SPCC.
Contracts usually don't call for GFM unless adequate
stocks of material are available to support requirements and
a replenishment pipeline is available to replenish stocks.
This is because the government would be in a default
situation on the contract if it were unable to provide the
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GFM, which would in turn create costly delays for the
contractor. These costs would ultimately be borne by the
government.
SPCC does not develop any allowance lists to support
contractor facilities which require GFM. Assets are laid-in
to the bonded storerooms based on a fair-share allocation of
wholesale system assets and anticipated demand for the
assets by the facility.
As discussed earlier the supply support being provided
for the depot maintenance of Harpoon missile sections and
components is an exception to the norm in GFM support. To
support this commercial depot, NAVAIR tasked MDAC to develop
and maintain the Harpoon Depot Support Material List (DSML)
[Ref. 9:p. 7-7]. The DSML is also referred to as the
Harpoon Stock Fund by NAVAIR-418 logistics personnel and
Depot Stock Allowance List (DSAL) by MDAC logistics
personnel. Stockage of initial bonded storeroom stocks was
accomplished by NAVAIR procurement, SPCC procurement and
buys of wholesale system stock by NAVAIR. Replenishment of
material in the DSML is the responsibility of MDAC and is
funded by NAVAIR-418. Replenishment material is provided by
MDAC, ordered from subcontractors and also requisitioned
from the Navy and DLA supply systems.
Utilizing a model developed by MDAC and NAVAIR-418,
repair part quantities required to support the depot
maintenance are computed. The model determines new repair
35
parts requirements in response to changes in the following
areas [Ref . 20]
:
(1) maintenance philosophy
(2) anticipated return rates of AURs at the NWSs
(3) projected turn-around times for repairs at MDAC
(4) scrap rates
(5) production lead times.
The MDAC system replenishes consumed stock on a
quarterly basis and utilizes the minimum-maximum stock level
concept. With the exception of specified material such as
4E cognizance group material (high explosives used in the
Harpoon warhead) MDAC has the option of obtaining
replenishment requirements from the commercial sector if the
procurement cost of the item is less than the cost of
procuring identical material from a Navy/DLA supply
activity. If the Navy/DLA purchase cost is less expensive,
MDAC will submit MILSTRIP requisitions for the material.
Currently MDAC is maintaining an inventory of depot
stock valued at $53,756,000. This inventory includes 21,700
line items. An additional $19,000,000 worth of assets are
now being procured. Discussions with a MDAC logistics
engineering executive indicated that ninety-five percent of
the material in the inventory was procured from the
commercial sector [Ref. 21] . The average administrative
lead time for procurement actions by MDAC is approximately 5
months. This is approximately half the administrative lead
time reported by SPCC. MDAC is responsible for maintaining
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an accountable balance for all assets in the DSML and
provides to NAVAIR-418 documented information on consumption
and usage.
Probably the best measure of effectiveness (MOE) to use
in evaluating the success of the DSML program is System
Material Availability (SMA) . Table II-3, provided by MDAC,
shows a 12 month review of MDAC SMA statistics [Ref. 22 :p.
1].
TABLE II-3
MDAC SYSTEM MATERIAL AVAILABILITY (PERCENT) FOR 198 6 AND
1987
1986




Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Avg
94 95 93 91 86 87 91.6
The MDAC statistics indicate that the DSML has consistently
exceeded the SMA goal of eighty-five percent which is
specified by SPCC and provided superb supply support to the
Harpoon depot maintenance facility.
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III. ALTERNATIVES FOR SUPPLY SUPPORT
OF THE OMNIBUS CONCEPT
Because the OMNIBUS concept is still in the early
developmental phase, no alternatives for the concept have
been discarded. Therefore, at this juncture there are
numerous alternatives for the type of facility or facilities
that may be considered for the Omnibus. Table III-l depicts
some of the decision variables which must be considered.
TABLE III-l
OMNIBUS DECISION VARIABLES
Maintenance Facility Decision Variables
Number of Maintenance Facilities
Location of the Maintenance Facility
Ownership of the Maintenance Facility
Operation of the Maintenance Facility
Ownership of Special Tooling and Test Equipment






Location of the Supply Support Facility
Communications and Data Systems for Supply
and Maintenance Support
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A. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DECISION VARIABLES
Each one of the decision variables identified in Table
III-l has alternatives which will be defined in the
following sections.
1 . Number of Maintenance Facilities
The decision makers 1 first task will probably be to
choose the number of maintenance facilities that will be
required for the Omnibus. Theoretically, the alternative
selected could be an integer value from one to infinity.
Realistically however, the number of maintenance facilities
chosen will probably be between 1 and 3 . Various measures
of effectiveness (MOEs) will be used to evaluate the value
selected for this decision variable. For example,
maintenance system resistance to hostile attack is an
important MOE. The resistance to attack increases with
increasing numbers of maintenance facilities. Facility and
inventory costs also increase with increasing numbers of
maintenance facilities while transportation costs may
decrease. Missile readiness is a third MOE which is likely
to be affected by the number of maintenance facilities. You
might expect missile readiness to increase with increasing
numbers of maintenance facilities. However this could
depend on choices made with regard to supply support. If
spare parts stockage isn't simultaneously increased with
increasing numbers of maintenance facilities, ALM readiness
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might decrease because of increased mean supply response
time for spare parts.
2 . Location of the Maintenance Facility
Closely tied to the decision on the number of
facilities is the decision variable for location. While
theoretically any of the many geographical locations in the
United States could be used, realistically only existing
government and contractor owned real estate and facilities
should be considered as alternatives. Alternatives for
either the government or contractors to buy real estate and
build facilities are certainly possible but they would
result in extensive delays in obtaining an operating Omnibus
program.
The measures of effectiveness for evaluating this
decision variable will differ depending on the number of
maintenance facilities chosen. For example, if only one
maintenance site is reguired, the MOEs to be used in
selecting the location may be transportation costs and
availability of transportation to move the AUR from the NWSs
to the maintenance site. During periods of limited fuel
availability and higher demands for transportation resources
(which would be experienced during surge and mobilization
efforts) the ALM transportation pipeline could be severely
constrained. On the other hand, if multiple maintenance
facilities are established near the fleet, the impact of
higher transportation costs and diminished transportation
40




Ownership of the Maintenance Facility
The alternatives for this decision variable can
either be government owned or contractor owned facilities or
both government owned and contractor owned facilities. The
decision variable is dependent on the number of facilities
selected for the concept. If only one facility is needed,
then it will be owned by either the government or a
contractor. If more than one facility is reguired they can
all be owned by the government, all owned by a single
contractor, some owned by a single contractor and the
remainder by the government, and some owned by the
government and the remainder owned by multiple contractors.
The last category is what currently exists for ALM depot
maintenance facilities. An example of an MOE which will be
used to evaluate this decision variable will be total cost
of the various ownership choices.
4 Operation of the Maintenance Facility
The two choices for this decision variable are
either government operation or contractor operation of the
facility. An example of an MOE might be the susceptibility
of the selected sites to labor problems such as strikes




Ownership of Special Tooling and Test Equipment
The decision variable is again limited to two
choices of either government ownership or contractor
ownership. Contractor ownership of special tooling and test
equipment would represent a significant capital investment
for the contractor and also increase the contractor's risk.
An MOE which might be used would be estimated total life
cycle costs for government acquisition of the special
tooling and test equipment as compared to total costs of
having the items provided by a contractor.
6 Repair Parts Ownership
With the decisions made on what type of maintenance
facility will be required for the Omnibus, the decision
maker must then choose the alternatives which will form the
supply support facility and structure. The two choices for
repair parts ownership are called government furnished
material (GFM) and contractor furnished material (CFM)
.
Government furnished material is material provided from Navy
and DLA supply system assets or from NAVAIR stocked
material. Contractor furnished material would be that
material which is procured or manufactured by the contractor
for Omnibus production use. MOEs which could be used





The choices for this decision variable are either
the Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) or contractor
provisioning. This alternative is closely tied to that of
ownership of the repair parts. If the repair parts are CFM,
the provisioning effort might best be done by the
contractor. If the repair parts are GFM, then the
provisioning would probably be the responsibility of SPCC.
An exception to this would be the MDAC DSML. In that case
the contractor is responsible for the provisioning effort




The choices for the storage facility for repair
parts include government ownership and contractor ownership.
The contractor for the storage facility may be different
from the contractor owning the maintenance facility. Total
cost of the storage might be an MOE that is used.
9 Storage Facility Operation
The choices for the operation of the storage
facility are either government or contractor operation. If
contractor operated, the contractor may be different from
both the owner of the maintenance facility and the supply
support facility. An MOE to be used in evaluating this
decision variable could be the forecasted inventory accuracy





Transportation Ownership and Operation
The choices for transportation ownership and
operation include government and contractor ownership and
operation. Government owned transportation could include
movement of material on Navy owned trucks and Military
Airlift Command aircraft. Contractor owned transportation
could include ownership of a transportation system by the
same owner or operator of the maintenance or supply support
system. Ownership could also be by an unrelated contractor.
An MOE which could be used in evaluating this decision
variable would be comparison of the life cycle costs of
government ownership and operation of transportation
equipment versus costs of purchasing transportation
services.
11 Location of the Supply Support Facility
Location of the supply support facility will be
highly dependent on the selection of the location (s) for the
maintenance facility or facilities, the number of facilities
chosen, and repair parts ownership. These decision
variables must be identified prior to making a decision on
the location of the supply support facility. An MOE to be
used in the decision variable evaluation might be the mean
supply response time (MSRT) that the supply support facility
is capable of providing. This MOE will be further discussed
in Chapter IV.
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12 . Communication and Data Systems for Supply and
Maintenance Support
Some means for transmitting requirements for repair
parts to the supply support system will be needed. A means
of keeping records of supply and maintenance data is also
required. An obvious candidate for performing these tasks
is an existing or a new computer system. The system can
either be owned by the government or a contractor. MOEs to
be used might be the ease in which a user may operate the
system and timeliness of data management.
B. EXAMPLES OF MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AND THEIR SUPPLY
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
At this point it is important to examine some of the
possible maintenance facilities and their supporting supply
facilities which may be chosen for the Omnibus program.
Table III-2 depicts some of the possibilities. It is
important to keep in mind that these possible facility
configurations are not individual alternatives but a group
of alternatives.
1. Government Owned-Government Operated (GOGO) Single
Site Facility
Two major assumptions made at this point are: (1)
that the site selected will be one of the existing organic
ALM maintenance facilities; and (2) the GOGO facility would




FACILITY OPTIONS FOR THE OMNIBUS














Currently SPCC stocks wholesale material to support
intermediate and depot level maintenance at the following
stock points:
(1) Navy Supply Center (NSC) Oakland
(2) Navy Supply Center (NSC) Norfolk
(3) Concord Naval Weapons Station
(4) Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station, Fall Brook Annex
(5) Yorktown Naval Weapons Station.
This material would now require consolidation at the
wholesale stock point servicing the site selected.
If, for example, the site selected was NADEP Alameda
then the material would have to be forwarded to NSC Oakland.
Oakland is an extremely large supply center and would
probably be able to accommodate the additional material.
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However, issues of material from NSC Oakland to customers at
NADEP Alameda take on the average of two to three days.
NADEP Alameda maintains no repairables in NIF stores stock
in order to keep the NIF material investment as low as
possible. Therefore, all repairables on the average would
be received in 2-3 days from NSC Oakland. If the
requirement were extremely urgent it would have to be met
using hand carried requisitions at NSC Oakland. This would
require considerable manpower expenditures by NADEP Alameda.
Receipt, stowage and issue functions at NSCs can
also be affected by high priority requirements such as short
notice resupply of a deploying battlegroup which would
require all available resources and adversely affect other
customers. The quality of NSC Oakland's computerized
inventory management system also affects receipt, stowage
and issue supply support functions. Downtime of the
computer system would be directly reflected in the ALM
maintenance facility's productivity. Manual issues at an
NSC during computer outages are usually restricted to high
priority requirements.
If the site selected was a Naval Weapons Station
such NWS Concord, additional storage facilities and
inventory management personnel would be required to handle
the additional material. The primary advantage of having
the material at an NWS is that issues of material can be
made much faster. Most material at an NWS is ordered,
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issued, and received by the customer (if available from on-
hand stock) within 24 hours. Supply drivers make several
deliveries each day to facilitate timely delivery. There
would be no interruptions in the receipt, storage and issue
functions due to higher priority commitments as experienced
at NSCs. The Supply Departments at NWSs are totally
dedicated to providing supply support for both surface and
air-launched missile maintenance.
Single siting of wholesale repair parts at either an
NSC or an NWS would expose them to a much greater risk of
loss due to natural disasters such as flooding and fire. Any
facility (such as NWS Concord and NSC Oakland) which is
located near the San Andreas fault is also susceptible to
earthquake damage. The single siting would also make the
facility a more inviting wartime target or a target for
terrorists.
An advantage that would be realized through single
siting would be the reduction in required NIF inventory
quantities. When there is more than one facility, more
inventory is necessary because the slower moving items
(insurance items) will usually be carried at both facilities
in the same quantities as would be kept at one facility.
This is due to the difficulty in predicting demand for these
items [Ref. 23:p. 220]. Single siting would also eliminate
transportation costs incurred for transhipment of material
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from stockpoints to requisitioner (such as from NWS Concord
to NWS Yorktown)
.
However, single siting would require transportation
of AURs from the NWSs to the Omnibus facility. If NADEP
Alameda was selected as the Omnibus maintenance facility
then the NWSs would have to transport the AURs to and from
Alameda. In the case of NWS Yorktown this would represent a
round trip coast to coast move. A dedicated transportation
system to move these AURs would be extremely costly but
essential to maintaining the maintenance pipeline.
Currently MDAC is using a dedicated transportation system to
ship RFI sections and new production assets of the Harpoon
missile to NWS Concord and NWS Yorktown from the MDAC
facility in St. Louis, Missouri. On the return backhaul
from the NWSs to MDAC are the NON-RFI sections requiring
depot rework. This system allowed the depot turnaround time
for Harpoon sections from NWS Yorktown to be reduced from an
average of 244 days to 166 days [Ref. 3:p. 25]. The cost of
the dedicated transportation system is approximately
$180, 000-$200,000 per year. The contract is awarded on an
annual basis by the Military Transportation Management
Command (MTMC) . The contract calls for the contractor to
make one trip a week to both NWS Concord and Yorktown [Ref.
24] .
If a GOGO single or multiple site concept is
selected for the Omnibus, those ALMs which have not been
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provisioned by SPCC (such as the depot level maintenance
supply support for the Harpoon missile) must go through the
provisioning process. From the time an ALM is provisioned
to the time assets start to be received from the SPCC
procurement process is approximately three to three and a
half years. ALM availability would be severely affected
while this procurement process is starting up.
2 . Government Owned-Government Operated (GOGO)
Multiple Site Facilities
Again, two major assumptions are made at this point:
(1) that the sites selected would be from the existing
organic ALM facilities; and (2) the GOGO facilities would
obtain all supply support from the Navy and DLA supply
systems.
If it was decided to have an East and West Coast
facility repairing the same missile types there are several
choices. The facilities could either be located at the
NADEPs, NWSs or a combination of both.
If the facilities were located at NADEP Alameda and
NADEP Norfolk the wholesale supply support would have to be
located at NSC Oakland and NSC Norfolk respectively. As
previously discussed in Chapter III-B.l there are drawbacks
to this support concept due primarily to the length of time
it takes an NSC to make an issue and deliver the parts.
Because the facilities would be repairing the same
missile types (i.e., both facilities have the same missile
repair capabilities) SPCC would be reguired to divide
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wholesale stock between the supporting activities. This
would result in higher costs due to increased capital
investment and increased holding costs.
If the facilities were located at either Concord NWS
or Seal Beach NWS, Fall Brook Annex on the West coast and
Yorktown NWS on the East coast SPCC would be required to
split the material between the two sites. The same problems
of splitting the wholesale material between NSCs would
present themselves if the material was to be split between
NWSs.
There would be a considerable advantage to having
the wholesale stock at the NWSs due to the significantly
reduced issue time to customers which can be achieved at the
NWSs versus the lengthy issue, shipment, and receipt
pipeline that exists between the NSCs and NADEPs.
If the decision was made to have the facilities
maintain different repair capabilities (i.e., all Harpoon
missiles repaired at NADEP Alameda and all Phoenix missiles
repaired at NADEP Norfolk) SPCC could then consolidate the
wholesale stock for the particular ALM at the supporting
supply activity.
Another possibility which may be selected would be
to have two organic facilities on each coast with an NWS
facility performing the intermediate maintenance and an
NADEP facility performing the depot level maintenance. If
the activities were going to repair all of the ALM systems
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at their respective level of maintenance, then SPCC would
again be faced with the problem of distributing wholesale
stock at the supporting stock points. Having the
intermediate level facilities remain at the NWSs would save
transportation costs for missile components which check out
as good assets on the intermediate level test equipment and
do not require depot level maintenance.
3 . Government Owned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) Single
Site Facility
The assumption made at this point is that the
government owned site which is selected for the Omnibus
facility would be one of the existing ALM maintenance
facilities.
A recent example of a GOCO type maintenance facility
was the Avionics Repair Facility at Naval Air Station
Lemoore, CA. This facility was operated by McDonnell
Douglas to repair selected F/A-18 aircraft avionics
components at both the intermediate and depot maintenance
levels. In addition McDonnell Douglas managed the inventory
of wholesale system repairable assets at another facility at
Lemoore called the Wholesale Support Site (WSS) [Ref. 25:p.
4]. NAVAIR provided the funding for the repair contract.
The contractor has three choices for obtaining
material supply support which include GFM, CFM and a
combination of GFM and CFM. If the contract specifies that
GFM will be used SPCC would provide wholesale system stock
to the contractor's bonded storeroom. Because of the large
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volume of transactions that would occur in the bonded
storeroom a computerized transaction reporting system would
need to be developed to communicate with SPCC. SPCC would
be required to provide for replenishment of the assets used
by the Omnibus facility. Once the wholesale material was
provided to the bonded storeroom an additional option would
be for the contractor to assume responsibility for the
replenishment process (as is being done with the Harpoon
DSML)
.
If the contract called for full CFM or contractor
replenished GFM, SPCC would be relieved of the
responsibility to do the provisioning for the intermediate
and depot levels of ALM maintenance, with a few exceptions
such as the high explosives used in the warhead.
Having SPCC give up its provisioning
responsibilities could prove to be disastrous. It is
anticipated that the Omnibus would be awarded as a multi-
year contract for a duration of three to five years. The
incumbent contractor may not win the subsequent Omnibus
contract. The new contractor may desire to have the GFM
replenished by SPCC. This would require a major effort by
SPCC to restart the ICP management functions. Personnel
would have to be identified and trained. The learning curve
would be lengthy and supply support would be affected during
the transitional period. Job security would be threatened
by the uncertainty of future awards of the Omnibus which
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might again call for the contractor to replenish GFM or use
CFM.
An example of the problem can be seen by reviewing
the Harpoon depot level supply support. SPCC has not
provisioned for the depot level of maintenance support for
the Harpoon. MDAC does not provide data to SPCC on design
change notices (DCNs) for items repaired only at the depot
level. SPCC's computer data base would require considerable
updating prior to any attempt to begin provisioning for the
depot level of maintenance for the Harpoon.
Deleting SPCC from the ICP role for the ALM's supply
support may also affect fleet surge and mobilization
capabilities. SPCC may be in a better position to expand
its management functions than a private contractor.
The contractor will probably wish to provide his own
material support through the use of CFM or use GFM with the
option of contractor replenishment of GFM. Either of these
options will allow the contractor to have direct control
over the material support function instead of having to
depend on another activity for support. Because contractors
don't have to comply with the stringent procurement
regulations that SPCC must abide by, they can realize
significantly reduced contract administrative leadtimes. In
addition they can easily contract for urgently required,
short notice material needs. The drawback to CFM is the
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high cost of capital that the contractor would be required
to invest in his inventory.
Probably the most advantageous supply support system
(from a contractor standpoint) would be to use GFM, which
then is replenished either by contractor procurement or by
requisitioning the material from defense supply stock if the
material is available and less costly. This is the system
that MDAC is using with the Harpoon DSML. MDAC assumes no
risk because the capital required for investment in
materials is provided by NAVAIR.
4 . Government Qwned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) Multiple
Site Facilities
The assumption to be made again is that the sites
selected for the Omnibus would be existing ALM maintenance
facilities. A further assumption is that more than one
contractor may be selected to operate the individual Omnibus
sites.
If only one contractor was selected to operate the
multiple sites and was receiving material supply support in
the form of GFM (with SPCC as the replenishment source) the
contractor would be limited in his resources to the existing
levels of wholesale system stock. The contractor would be
faced with the problem of how to divide the material in an
optimal manner between the repair sites.
If there were multiple contractors operating the
selected sites with the same repair capabilities and
material needs which are required as GFM (with SPCC as the
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replenishment source) the problem becomes more complicated.
SPCC would have to try to provide wholesale system stock in
an equitable manner at the various bonded storerooms. This
may be difficult to do because of the limitations of the
wholesale provisioning models with respect to insurance type
items. The lack of adequate insurance items would require
SPCC to have to direct shipments between different bonded
storerooms. This could prove to be difficult because of the
inter-company transfers of material.
Another major problem that could develop with GOCO
multiple-site facilities would be encountered when there are
multiple contractors operating the selected sites and each
contractor wants to employ a different supply support
system. For example, an East and West coast Omnibus
facility are required with the same repair capabilities at
both sites. The West coast operations contract is awarded
to Raytheon Corporation and the East coast contract is
awarded to MDAC. MDAC chooses to continue utilizing the
supply support system modeled on the DSML concept for the
operation of its facility. Raytheon opts to obtain all of
its material as GFM with SPCC and DLA activities performing
the replenishment functions. This would require SPCC to
have to provision all of the ALMs in the Omnibus concept.
However, the quantities of ALMs and support equipment being




The result of this provisioning effort by SPCC would
be that many items which would have met the procurement
criteria with the full population of missiles and support
equipment, now fail to meet the criteria. Raytheon would be
constrained in the number of insurance items it would have
available in the bonded storeroom stock. MDAC on the other
hand would not be constrained by the wholesale provisioning
model. If MDAC felt strongly that they needed certain
insurance items and NAVAIR would agree to fund them, then
they would be procured by MDAC as GFM.
To have two different supply systems providing for
the replenishment of the GFM does not make good economic
sense. Consolidation of the function, either by using the
defense supply system or a single contractor, is necessary.
This would allow for both administrative economies as well
as savings generated through use of consolidated buys and
use of economic order quantities (EOQ)
.
5 . Other Facility Configurations
The remaining facility possibilities (5-8 in Table
III-2) all call for the Omnibus facilities to be contractor
owned which is the only difference between the possibilities
that have already been evaluated (1-4 in Table III-2). The
government is going to have to fund the costs of the needed
supply support facilities which will include warehouses,
administrative spaces, storage aids, material handling
equipment and computer equipment for inventory management.
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The costs of maintaining GFM may, in the case of a
contractor owned-contractor operated (COCO) facility, be
charged to the government as storage costs. For example,
MDAC currently has 21,700 items in the DSML which eguates to
approximately 10,000 sguare feet of required storage space.
The cost for maintaining the DSML storage space is $26.00
per square foot for a total annual cost of $260,000 [Ref.
22:p. 2]. The example clearly shows that the cost of
contractor storage facilities can be considerable.
At contractor owned facilities which have a
requirement for replenishment support from SPCC, a computer
linkage for transmitting requirements is essential. The
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) used a dedicated computer
system called the Disk Oriented Supply System (DOSS) to
support the F/A-18 aircraft Wholesale Support Site (WSS) at
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA [Ref. 25:p. 3]. A system such
as DOSS might be the key to establishing a successful real
time link between contractor sites and SPCC which will
provide for expeditious stock replenishment.
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR EVALUATING MATERIAL
SUPPLY SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES IN THE OMNIBUS PROGRAM
In this chapter measures of effectiveness (MOEs) which
can be used to evaluate the material supply support
alternatives for the Omnibus program will be examined.
Coyle and Bardi [Ref. 23 :p. 427] indicate that logistic
systems (of which supply support is a subset) can be







The process of choosing the right MOEs to evaluate
alternatives should start with an examination of what the
organization's goals and objectives are. Certain MOEs will
provide a clearer picture of the alternatives being analyzed
if they are correctly matched to organizational goals and
objectives. There are many difficulties in accomplishing
this task as Quade points out:
When an individual or public body calls on analysis to
help make a decision or choose a policy, it is with a
purpose in mind, some objective or goal that the decision
or policy is supposed to accomplish. Unfortunately such
goals or objectives may not be clearly stated or even
fully perceived by the decision maker, let alone be
unambiguously communicated to the analyst. In addition
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even for the individual decision-maker and certainly for a
composite one, the goals are likely to be multiple and
often conflicting. [Ref. 26:p. 85]
Therefore it is important to look at what the objectives of
NAVAIR-418 are, before a determination can be made as to
what MOEs should be used to evaluate the Omnibus material
supply support alternatives.
In a recent corporate business plan NAVAIR-418 presented
the following objectives [Ref. 6]:
(1) identify and manage logistical resources
(2) influence airborne weapons system design
(3) insure optimal supportability and provide support
throughout total life cycles of ALMs
(4) Meet or exceed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asset
readiness objectives in a cost effective and timely
manner.
These objectives, when coupled with the goals of the Omnibus
program highlight the problem of trying to make decisions
when you have multiple goals and objectives which are of a
conflicting nature. The Omnibus goals which further
complicate the analysis and decision making process include
[Ref. 6]:
(1) develop a more manageable logistics/maintenance
program
(2) create a logistics system which responds to fleet
needs
(3) provide improved ALM readiness
(4) provide for effective operation of support
facilities
(5) retain surge/mobilization capabilities.
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The two predominant concerns raised in both the NAVAIR-
418 corporate business plan objectives and the Omnibus
program goals are readiness and total cost expectations.
The following discussion will examine these very important
concerns and their use as MOEs for the Omnibus supply
support alternatives.
A. READINESS
At this juncture it is important to note that readiness
and availability are synonymous. Readiness goals for ALMs
are defined by the CNO and are called asset readiness
objectives (AROs) . Taylor and Bednash provide an excellent
definition for ARO and how ARO is determined:
ARO is defined as the percentage of missiles in the
inventory that are classified as Ready-for-Issue (RFI)
.
These AROs are set by the CNO for the fiscal year with
regard to projected fleet requirements for each of the
missile systems within the inventory. Calculation of ARO
is obtained by dividing the number of projected RFI
missiles by the total number of missiles in the inventory.
Once the ARO has been set for each missile system by the
CNO, NAVAIR-418 must formulate a maintenance plan which
meets these objectives. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
The problem with this readiness definition is that it
doesn't give any insight into the actual availability,
maintainability and reliability of the ALMs.
NAVAIR-418 has recognized the shortcomings of this
readiness measure and is in the process of developing a plan
for improving the collection, analysis and reporting of
reliability, maintainability, availability and quality data
[Ref. 27]. The plan is designed to provide NAVAIR with a
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single accurate and responsive reliability, maintainability,
availability and quality (RMA&Q) assessment capability. 11
The RMA&Q study group's interim report calls for reporting
of data in different formats for use by various management
levels [Ref. 28]. Of special note is the executive level
management report which is to be called the Management
Digest Matrix. This report will provide the executive level
manager with several factors of interest for reliability,
availability and maintainability for each ALM. These
factors are described in Appendix B.
From the viewpoint of this thesis the factors which are
represented in the Management Digest Matrix which are the
most important MOEs are Operational Availability (AQ ) and
Mean Down Time (MDT) . MDT is an MOE which includes both
Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (Mc^) and Mean Preventative
Maintenance Time (Mp^) as well as Mean Logistics Delay Time
(MLDT) and Mean Administrative Delay Time (MADT) . MDT is
the elapsed time which is required (when the system is down)
11The following definitions are being used by the
NAVAIR Reliability, Maintainability, Availability and
Quality (RMA&Q) study group which is responsible for
development of the plan:
Reliability : Probability that an item will perform its
intended function for a specific time interval under stated
conditions.
Maintainability : Measure of the ability of an item to be
retained in or restored to an operable condition.
Availability : Measure of the degree a system is in a
serviceable condition and committable to the fleet at any
random point in time.
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to repair and restore a system to its full operational
capability or to retain a system in that condition [Ref.
8:p. 44].
Operational Availability (A ) is defined as the
probability that a system or equipment will operate in a
satisfactory manner, if used under specified conditions in
an actual operational environment [Ref. 8:p. 65].
Operational Availability can be expressed in the following
ways:
MTBM
(1) A =° MTBM + MDT
(2, ° MTBF + MTTR + MLDT + MADT
In the first expression MTBM is the Mean Time Between
Maintenance. In the second expression MTBF is the Mean Time
Between Failure and MTTR is the Mean Time to Repair which is
equivalent to MCf
Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) comprises one of the
biggest elements in MDT. It is made up of maintenance down
time which is accumulated while waiting for receipt of spare
parts, waiting for transportation, and waiting for
availability of required test equipment and facilities [Ref.
8:p. 44]
Although MLDT is a major element of MDT, it has not been
broken out as a separate factor for review in the Management
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Digest Matrix. This is a major oversight. MLDT is as
important or more important than many of the factors
proposed for review. Blanchard explains this quite clearly:
With the advent of new technologies and increasing
complexities of systems today, combined with limited
resources and reduced budgets, it is essential that all
facets of a system be addressed on an integrated basis.
If the results are to be effective, logistics must be
considered on an integral basis with other elements of the
system. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
To manage logistics support it is essential to measure
supply and transportation effectiveness together since both
affect logistics delay time at a maintenance level. A
factor that can be used to evaluate supply and
transportation effectiveness is called Mean Supply Response
Time (MSRT) . MSRT is defined as the average time (in days)
required to satisfy customer demands regardless of whether
the items required are stocked in the supply system and also
regardless of whether the requirements can be filled from
stock on hand [Ref. ll:pp. 1-21]. MSRT could be substituted
for MLDT in the Operational Availability equation. The
reflection of MSRT in the Management Digest Matrix would
give the NAVAIR executive level a much clearer understanding
of the effects of logistics policies and management upon
Operational Availability.
The current MOE used by the Navy wholesale inventory
system to evaluate material supply support is System
Material Availability (SMA) . SMA tries to provide a
measurement of the percentage of requisitions which are
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filled by the supply system with no delay [Ref. 11: pp. 3-
25]. As discussed in Chapter II-A.6 and Chapter II-B both
SPCC and MDAC use SMA as an MOE to evaluate supply support.
MSRT is a much more useful MOE than SMA because SMA only
measures the performance with respect to stockage at a
particular level. MSRT, on the other hand, measures
everything which SMA measures, plus it measures the very
important additional factor of time .
It is recommended that NAVAIR-418 incorporate MSRT as a
measure of MLDT into the executive level Management Digest
Matrix in order to give managers a complete system view of
each ALM. MSRT will highlight both supply and
transportation problems which may require executive level
attention.
It is also recommended that MSRT be used as an MOE to
evaluate the various alternatives for the Omnibus concept.
Using available modeling techniques, estimates of MSRT for
the alternatives could be obtained to aid the decision maker
in making his selection from the alternatives.
B. TOTAL COST
The guidelines for using total costs as an MOE in
comparing the alternatives for the Omnibus program are
provided in the Department of Defense In-House versus
Contract Commercial and Industrial Activities Cost
Comparison Handbook [Ref. 29]. The key to having an
effective comparison is the adherence to several ground
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rules which are outlined in the revised OMB Circular A-76.
Two of the most important ground rules are described as
follows [Ref . 5]
:
(1) Both government and commercial cost figures must be
based on the same scope of work and the same level of
performance. This requires the preparation of a
sufficiently precise work statement with performance
standards that can be monitored for either mode of
performance.
(2) Cost comparisons are to be aimed at full cost, to the
maximum extent practical in all cases. All
significant government costs (including allocation of
overhead and indirect costs) must be considered, both
for direct government performance and for
administration of a contract.
The statement of work will require an extensive amount
of effort to ensure that the performance by either an in-
house government activity or by a contractor will satisfy
the government's needs. The statement of work will need to
specify standards of performance from which to base an
evaluation of the alternatives. Such criteria would include
minimum standards to be achieved for some or all of the
factors cited in the NAVAIR-418 executive level Management
Digest Matrix as well as MSRT. It is important to note that
the statement of work should clearly describe what needs to
be done but does not prescribe how it should be done [Ref.
29:p. 6]
.
In order to make fair cost comparisons, all significant
government costs must be taken into account. As an example
in the area of repair parts, all indirect costs associated
with repair parts obtained from other agencies (such as DLA)
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will be added to the cost of the repair parts. These
indirect costs account for the costs of the acquisition and
storage of the material by the agency. In order to reflect
full cost, the indirect cost markup to be added to an item
which is stocked by a DLA activity is currently 24.5
percent. The markup for an item which is procured by DLA
for direct delivery to an activity is 13.4 percent [Ref.
29:p. 15].
An area which cannot be overlooked in making a cost
comparison involves the transportation costs which might be
incurred by the government if a contractor is chosen to
operate the Omnibus facility. Transportation costs could
include: transporting government furnished equipment,
supplies and material. These costs need to be added to the
contractors proposal in order to make an equitable
comparison of the costs.
Another tool for evaluating costs of supply support is
available in the form of a model called the Availability
Centered Inventory Model (ACIM) . The model provides a
realistic estimate of total inventory requirements at the
least total cost to support a specified readiness level
assuming that MTBF, Mc^, and Mpt are fixed by the missile
design and won't change in the near term. The model allows
the Navy a way to deviate from the standard wholesale models
in order to obtain enhanced levels of supply support
required to attain the CNO ' s readiness objectives [Ref.
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30: p. 1] . The output from this model would give the
decision maker an excellent "should cost" estimate to be
used in cost comparisons of supply support alternatives.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Air-launched missiles have evolved into highly complex
and costly weapons systems. The cost of maintaining these
ALMs in a RFI state has also grown, along with the missile
acquisition cost. These rising maintenance costs can be
attributed to the requirement for more complex test
equipment, maintenance personnel with increased skill
levels, and increasingly expensive repair parts.
The cost of maintaining the missiles is directly
proportional to the size of the missile inventory. The ALM
missile inventories will swell significantly, tripling in
size from 1987 through the year 2000. In an effort to
maximize the effectiveness of available maintenance dollars
NAVAIR-418 is exploring a new maintenance concept which will
combine the intermediate and depot level ALM maintenance
functions into one. This new maintenance concept is called
the Omnibus and will be a contracted function. This
function will be open for bids from both Navy and commercial
activities.
As discussed in Chapter III the decision maker has a
multitude of alternatives to choose from in selecting the
Omnibus structure. The aggregate of the selected
alternatives will define a unique supply support structure.
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Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT) , as a proxy for Mean
Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) , and total cost comparisons are
two MOEs which will be essential to effective evaluation of
the various Omnibus alternatives.
Because the Omnibus program is still very much in the
developmental stage, it is essential that the health of the
existing material supply support system be evaluated and
improvements made.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The same level of effort which is being expended to
acquire ALMs does not appear to extend to ensuring that
sufficient material supply support will be obtained. Vital
PSD inputs are not being provided by NAVAIR to SPCC in a
timely manner. This lack of PSD inputs has a retarding
affect on the whole repair parts provisioning and budgeting
process.
The lack of COSBAL support (especially for major support
equipment) at both the intermediate and depot level ALM
maintenance sites is also of great concern. The current
models being used by the Navy Supply System are not adequate
to provide the ALM maintenance community with its repair
parts needs. The material supply support being provided by
commercial activities (such as MDAC ' s depot level support
program) is far superior as evidenced by the SMAs cited in
Chapter II-B. This is because the commercial sector is not
constrained by restrictive provisioning models, restrictive
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procurement regulations and conflicts in funding of stores
accounts. It is very difficult to compare Navy and
commercial material supply support precisely because the
rules by which each organization must abide are so glaringly
different. Contractor material supply support appears to be
very attractive because of its reduced procurement times,
the ability to respond to short notice material requirements
and overall flexibility. The question that arises is
whether, during periods of austere funding, NAVAIR-418 would
be able to provide the funding necessary to procure
commercial material supply support on the scale necessary to
support the Omnibus concept. Even during periods of austere
funding the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) would be able to fill its
material supply support role.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made based on the
conclusions cited above:
1. NAVAIR-418 and SPCC (Code 0533) convene a meeting to
determine the causes of the problems which are
making it difficult to transfer PSD inputs from
NAVAIR to SPCC for ALMs. Once the problems are
resolved it is imperative that future submissions be
made in a timely manner.
2. Re-evaluate the policy of not providing COSBAL
support to intermediate and depot level ALM
facilities because they are NIF funded. At a
minimum, informational COSBALs should be prepared by
SPCC for all major support equipment used at the two
levels of maintenance. NAVAIR should then fund the
NIF activities performing ALM maintenance for the
purchase of the material identified in the
informational allowance list.
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3. SPCC needs to explore possibilities for improving
procurement administrative leadtimes. The current
administrative leadtime average of 10 months is
excessive.
4. SPCC and NAVAIR should establish a program to
improve the level of communication between ALM
logistics managers at NAVAIR and item managers at
SPCC. Cooperation between the two groups is
essential to improving the quality of the existing
material supply support system.
5. SPCC and NAVAIR jointly promulgate procedures to be
followed by requisitioners when expediting urgently
required material.
6. NAVAIR-418 use Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT) as a
proxy for Mean Logistics Delay Time and reflect MSRT
data on the executive level Management Digest Matrix
report. This will enable NAVAIR executive level
managers to identify both supply and transportation
problems being encountered by specific missile
systems.
7. NAVAIR-418 use operational availability (readiness)



















13. Containers for the ALMs cited above.
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APPENDIX B
RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND AVAILABILITY FACTORS
A. Reliability Factors
1. Operational Reliability (R ) , the probability that a
system will perform its intended function in the
operational environment, as measured at the IMA when
returned for SIST/MDD. This method provides an
indication of Operational Reliability at the end of
the worst case analysis of Operational Reliability.
It was selected to present to the NAVAIR executive
that "the system is no worse than R . M Operational
Reliabilities for any given period of time or the
average Operational Reliability in the fleet will be
evaluated using probabilistic models and available
data.
2. Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) Reliability
Requirements (Rt) / the stated reliability requirement
per the system TEMP.
3. Achieved Production Reliability (Ra ) , the reliability
demonstrated by Production Reliability Test.
4. Specified Reliability (Rs ) , the probability that a
system will function for a specified interval under
specified conditions. This is also referred to as
design reliability.
5. Free Flight Performance Raw (Pr ) , the flight
performance success ratio from planned fleet firings.
6. Free Flight Performance Evaluated (Pe ) , the flight
performance success ratio after analysis of all test
and repair factors prior to firing.
B. Maintainability Factors
1. Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (Mct) , the average
time required to perform corrective maintenance at the
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) and depot
(DOP) levels.
2. Mean Preventive Maintenance Time (Mpt ) , the average
time to perform scheduled preventive maintenance.
74
Mean Down Time (MDT) , this factor includes Mc -j- + Mpt +
logistic and administrative down time.
Turn Around Time (TAT) , the total time from system
downing to reissue and installation. This is the
total time a system is not in the fleet; and includes
MDT plus other factors and time periods prior to
issue/installation to the fleet.
C. Availability Factors
1. Operational Availability (A ) , the probability that a
system is available in the operational environment.
2. TEMP Availability Requirement (A^) , the availability
requirement as stated in the TEMP.
3. Achieved Availability (Aa ) , the probability that a
system is available excluding logistic and
administrative delay times.
4. Specified Availability (As ) , the probability that a
system is available under specified conditions in an
ideal support environment.
5. Asset Readiness (Ar ) , the total assets available over
the total assets required.
Source: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (Code-
418) , Reliability, Maintainability
,
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